2025년 08월 28일 출간 | ISBN : 1130322580 | 692쪽 | 규격外 | 11판

들어가며 1 게임이론이란 무엇인가? ························································· 001 2 게임이론의 역사와 발전 ·························································· 003 SECTION 01 전략과 경쟁 CHAPTER 01 게임의 형태와 해 1.1 게임의 구성요소 ··································································· 011 1.2 게임의 형태 ········································································· 018 1.2.1 전 개 형 / 018 1.2.2 전 략 형 / 020 1.3 게임의 해 ··········································································· 022 1.4 우월전략과 열등전략 ····························································· 023 1.5 열등전략의 단계적 소거 ························································· 028 1.6 순수전략 내쉬균형 ································································ 032 1.7 여러 2×2 전략형게임 ··························································· 036 CHAPTER 02 전략형게임의 응용 2.1 생산량경쟁 과점시장 ··························································· 042 2.1.1 간단한 예시 / 042 2.1.2 쿠르노 복점모형 / 044 2.1.3 쿠르노 과점모형 / 049 2.2 가격경쟁 과점시장 ································································ 051 2.2.1 동질적 재화 / 051 2.2.2 차별화된 과점 / 053 2.2.3 엡손(Epson)의 부메랑 / 055 2.3 제품 차별화 ········································································· 057 2.3.1 호텔링 모형 / 057 2.3.2 민주 선거 및 중위투표자정리 / 060 2.4 공유지의 비극 ······································································ 063 2.5 공조게임과 네트워크산업 ······················································· 071 2.5.1 네트워크효과 / 071 2.5.2 포지티브 피드백 / 073 2.5.3 공조게임 / 075 2.6 공조게임과 케인즈 경기변동론 ················································ 080 2.7 손해배상법 ·········································································· 083 CHAPTER 03 혼합전략의 개념과 응용 3.1 강단계소거와 합리화전략 ······················································· 087 3.2 혼합전략 내쉬균형 ································································ 090 3.2.1 순수전략 내쉬균형의 부존재 가능성 / 090 3.2.2 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 계산 / 091 3.2.3 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 성질 / 093 3.3 백화점의 바겐세일 ································································ 096 3.4 가위바위보 ·········································································· 099 3.5 정치경제적 소모전 ································································ 102 3.6 투표의 역설과 중추투표가설 ··················································· 107 3.6.1 양 후보 지지자들의 수가 같은 k＝m의 경우 / 108 3.6.2 후보 B 지지자들이 후보 A 지지자들보다 많은 k＜m의 경우 / 109 CHAPTER 04 내쉬균형의 성질과 대안 4.1 내쉬균형과 강단계소거의 관계 ················································ 116 4.2 최소극대와 최대극소 ····························································· 120 4.2.1 안전성과 최소극대 / 120 4.2.2 최대극소 / 122 4.2.3 혼합전략 최소극대 및 최대극소 / 123 4.3 최소극대, 최대극소, 내쉬균형의 관계 ········································ 125 4.4 여행자의 딜레마·································································· 128 4.5 초점과 위험우위 ··································································· 131 4.5.1 초 점 / 132 4.5.2 위험우위와 보수우위 / 134 4.6 진화게임(evolutionary game) ················································ 137 4.6.1 학습, 진화, 경로의존성 / 137 4.6.2 진화안정적 균형 / 139 4.6.3 동태적 진화안정성 / 142 4.7 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 직관성 ··················································· 145 4.8 상관균형 ············································································ 146 SECTION 02 공약과 신빙성 CHAPTER 05 전개형게임 5.1 전개형게임 ·········································································· 155 5.1.1 전개형의 개념과 특징 / 155 5.1.2 전개형과 전략형의 관계 / 157 5.1.3 행태전략 / 159 5.2 위협과 약속의 신빙성 ···························································· 161 5.3 부분게임완전균형과 역진귀납법 ·············································· 164 5.4 역진귀납법과 완전균형의 현실성 ············································· 167 5.5 전략적 공약 ········································································· 171 5.5.1 내구재 독점판매 / 171 5.5.2 듀폰의 생산용량 확장 / 173 5.6 공약의 신빙성을 높이는 방안 ·················································· 178 5.6.1 자신의 손을 묶음으로써 신빙성을 높이는 방안 / 178 5.6.2 보수의 구조를 바꿈으로써 공약의 신빙성을 높이는 방안 / 181 CHAPTER 06 전개형게임의 응용 6.1 선점효과가 있는 과점시장 ······················································ 185 6.1.1 스타켈버그 과점 모형 / 186 6.1.2 선도-추종 관계 / 189 6.2 뱅크런 금융공황 ··································································· 191 6.2.1 뱅크런의 자기실현적 성질 / 191 6.2.2 예금보험제도를 통한 신뢰성 회복 / 194 6.3 소비자 예속 ········································································· 196 6.3.1 전환비용과 소비자 예속 / 196 6.3.2 벨아틀랜틱의 AT&T 교환기 설치 / 197 6.3.3 기타 사례들 / 199 6.4 전략적 무역정책 ··································································· 201 6.5 지리적 입지선정 및 가격결정 ·················································· 210 CHAPTER 07 협상과 중재 7.1 유한수명 협상 ······································································ 218 7.2 최후통첩협상, 독재자게임 및 공평정의 ······································ 226 7.3 무한수명 협상 ······································································ 231 7.4 협상지연, 파업, 결렬과 미비정보의 역할 ···································· 237 7.5 중 재 ················································································· 239 7.5.1 일반중재 / 239 7.5.2 최종제안중재 / 240 SECTION 03 반복과 협조 CHAPTER 08 반복게임 8.1 보복, 보상 및 협조 ································································ 249 8.2 반복게임의 요소와 균형 ························································· 250 8.2.1 역사와 전략 / 250 8.2.2 반복게임에서 보수 개념 / 253 8.2.3 반복게임 균형 / 255 8.3 유한반복게임 ······································································· 256 8.3.1 유한반복 죄수의 딜레마 게임 / 256 8.3.2 다수의 내쉬균형을 갖는 게임의 유한반복 / 260 8.4 재협상방지 ·········································································· 265 8.5 무한반복 죄수의 딜레마 ························································· 269 8.5.1 반복게임 전략 / 269 8.5.2 내쉬균형 / 272 8.5.3 부분게임완전균형 / 275 8.6 팃포탯의 이론과 실례 ···························································· 278 8.6.1 균형 분석 / 278 8.6.2 팃포탯의 실례 / 281 CHAPTER 09 전래정리 9.1 사회적 실현가능성 및 개인적 합리성 ········································ 285 9.2 무한반복게임의 내쉬균형 ······················································· 290 9.3 무한반복게임의 부분게임완전균형 ··········································· 291 9.4 유한반복게임의 내쉬균형 ······················································· 294 9.5 다양한 예시 ········································································· 296 CHAPTER 10 반복게임의 응용 10.1 카 르 텔 ············································································ 301 10.1.1 생산량카르텔 / 301 10.1.2 가격카르텔 / 305 10.2 불완전정보하의 담합 ··························································· 308 10.3 담합과 카르텔의 실례 ·························································· 312 10.3.1 OPEC의 담합과 국제유가 / 312 10.3.2 다이아몬드는 영원히 / 315 10.3.3 가격선도 / 318 10.3.4 유통전략을 통한 경쟁제한 / 321 10.3.5 자진신고자 감면 제도 / 323 10.4 실효임금과 생산성 향상 ······················································· 325 10.4.1 실효임금이론 / 325 10.4.2 실효임금이론의 응용 / 331 10.5 정책의 비일관성과 정부 신뢰 ················································ 335 SECTION 04 정보와 제도 CHAPTER 11 정태적 미비정보 게임 11.1 서 론 ············································································· 345 11.2 베이즈게임 및 균형의 개념 ··················································· 348 11.2.1 정태적 미비정보 게임 / 348 11.2.2 베이즈내쉬균형 / 350 11.3 변형된 투자－진입게임 ························································ 351 11.4 생산비에 대한 미비정보하의 쿠르노 복점모형 ··························· 357 11.5 공공재 건설게임 ································································· 361 11.6 정보우위는 반드시 유익한가? ················································ 366 11.7 근사주지사실과 미비정보게임 ················································ 368 11.7.1 협공(coordinated attack) / 368 11.7.2 동전 테두리의 톱니문양 / 369 11.7.3 흙투성이 꼬마들 / 370 11.7.4 봉투교환게임(envelope exchange) / 373 11.7.5 투기거래의 불가능성 / 376 CHAPTER 12 경 매 12.1 개 요 ············································································· 381 12.2 사적가치 경매 ···································································· 387 12.2.1 영국식 경매 / 388 12.2.2 차가 경매 / 390 12.2.3 최고가 경매 / 392 12.2.4 네덜란드식 경매 / 398 12.3 수익동등정리와 효율성 ························································ 399 12.4 공통가치 경매와 승자의 저주 ················································ 403 12.5 위험회피 성향이 미치는 영향 ················································ 409 12.6 입찰담합 ··········································································· 411 12.7 부록 A: 최고가 입찰 균형 전략의 성질 ···································· 415 CHAPTER 13 메커니즘의 설계 13.1 개 요 ············································································· 419 13.2 고객차별화의 단순모형 ························································ 424 13.2.1 여객기의 좌석등급 / 424 13.2.2 기업의 최적전략 / 426 13.3 고객차별화의 일반모형 ························································ 430 13.3.1 개요 / 430 13.3.2 고객차별화의 실례 / 432 13.3.3 일반 모형 / 434 13.4 공공재 건설을 위한 그로브스-레드야드 메커니즘 ······················ 440 13.4.1 단순 예시 / 440 13.4.2 일반모형 / 442 13.4.3 메커니즘 이행의 신빙성 / 444 13.5 배타적 유통 계약 ································································ 446 13.6 메커니즘 설계와 현시원리 ···················································· 449 13.6.1 메커니즘 설계 / 449 13.6.2 현시원리 / 452 SECTION 05 신호, 선별, 계약 CHAPTER 14 동태적 미비정보 게임 14.1 문제의 제기 ······································································· 459 14.2 완전베이즈균형 ·································································· 461 14.3 완전베이즈균형의 계산 예 ···················································· 466 14.4 동태적 미비정보 게임 ·························································· 469 14.5 신호게임 ··········································································· 473 14.5.1 신호게임의 정의 / 473 14.5.2 신호게임에서 완전베이즈균형 / 476 14.6 민사소송에서 상호 합의 ······················································· 479 14.7 평 판 ············································································· 485 14.8 직관적 신념과 전진귀납법 ···················································· 490 14.8.1 독점기업의 진입제한가격 부과게임 / 490 14.8.2 외부대안이 있는 성대결게임 / 494 CHAPTER 15 역선택, 신호와 선별 15.1 자동차 품질보증과 비싼 광고 ················································ 498 15.1.1 미비정보가 시장실패에 미치는 영향 / 498 15.1.2 품질보증, 광고, 브랜드가치 / 500 15.2 학력 인플레이션의 순기능 ···················································· 506 15.3 금융시장의 역선택, 신용할당 및 재무구조 ································ 519 15.3.1 역선택과 신용할당 / 520 15.3.2 신호발송으로서의 지분 제안 / 526 15.4 다양한 보험상품과 소비자 선택 ············································· 534 15.4.1 보험을 통한 위험분산 / 534 15.4.2 모 형 / 535 15.4.3 역선택과 시장실패 / 538 15.4.4 보험상품의 다양화 / 541 CHAPTER 16 대리인 문제와 유인계약 16.1 감춰진 행동과 도덕적 해이 ··················································· 547 16.2 단순 모형 ·········································································· 551 16.2.1 불완전정보와 도덕적 해이 / 551 16.2.2 유인계약 / 553 16.2.3 고정급이 성과급보다 우월한 경우 / 557 16.3 최적 계약: 위험분담과 유인제공 ············································ 560 16.4 일반화된 대리인 모형 ·························································· 563 16.4.1 완전정보하의 자원배분 / 564 16.4.2 불완전정보하의 유인설계 / 565 16.5 토너먼트 경쟁 ···································································· 572 16.5.1 완전정보하의 자원배분 / 572 16.5.2 불완전정보하의 유인계약 / 574 16.6 공동생산 체제와 주인의 역할 ················································ 578 16.7 유인설계와 경제제도 ··························································· 584 16.7.1 경영자 보수와 기업 소유지배구조 / 584 16.7.2 징세청부제와 세무공무원제 / 589 SECTION 06 협조게임과 사회선택 CHAPTER 17 협조적 게임이론 17.1 협조적 협상 ······································································· 595 17.2 협조적 협상해 ···································································· 598 17.3 연합형 게임 ······································································· 600 17.4 코어 ················································································· 602 17.5 섀플리값 ··········································································· 604 17.5.1 개념과 공식 / 605 17.5.2 섀플리값의 성질 / 608 17.6 권력지수 ··········································································· 609 17.6.1 섀플리-슈빅 권력지수 / 609 17.6.2 반자프-콜먼 권력지수 / 611 CHAPTER 18 사회선호와 사회선택 18.1 사회적 선호 ······································································· 613 18.2 애로우의 불가능성 정리 ······················································· 614 18.2.1 애로우의 공리 / 614 18.2.2 불가능성 정리 / 616 18.3 사회적 선택 ······································································· 619 18.3.1 사회선택함수 / 619 18.3.2 콩도르세의 역설 / 621 18.4 투표 제도 ·········································································· 624 18.4.1 최다득표제 / 624 18.4.2 점수투표제 / 626 18.4.3 승인투표제 / 629 18.4.4 결선투표제 / 630 18.5 형사재판 제도와 피의자의 운명 ············································· 632 CHAPTER 19 미비정보하의 사회선택 19.1 기버드-새터스웨이트 불가능성 정리 ······································ 635 19.2 메커니즘 설계를 통한 사회선택의 구현 ···································· 641 19.3 안정적 매칭 ······································································· 646 19.3.1 매칭에 의한 자원배분 / 646 19.3.2 안정적 매칭 / 648 19.4 게일-섀플리 알고리즘 ························································· 650 19.5 매칭간의 비교 및 전략적 조작 ··············································· 654 19.5.1 매칭간의 비교 / 654 19.5.2 전략적 조작 / 654 찾아보기 ························································································ 657

제11판 머리말

이번 전면개정판의 가장 큰 변화는 이전 판본에서 기초 개념을 개괄적으로 설명하는 데 그쳤던 협조게임이론을 제6편의 세 장으로 독립시켜 깊이 있게 다루었다는 것이다. 구체적으로 협조적 협상해, 연합형 게임에서의 대표적 해 개념인 코어와 섀플리값, 사회선호함수와 애로우의 불가능성 정리, 사회선택함수와 그 응용 사례인 투표 제도, 미비정보하에서 사회선택함수와 기버드·새터스웨이트 불가능성 정리, 메커니즘 설계를 통한 사회선택의 구현, 쌍방 매칭 등이다.
연습문제 해답, 부록, 참고문헌은 본책에서 분리하여 QR코드로 링크하여 다운로드 받도록 하였다. 또한 본판 인쇄 이후 찾아낸 오탈자의 정오표를 수시로 업데이트하여 QR코드로 스캔하도록 하였다.
본서를 두 학기에 나누어 강의할 경우 가이드라인은 다음과 같다. 가칭 《게임이론Ⅰ》에서는 제1장~제11장, 제14장을 다루되 시간이 허락하면 제12장 경매이론과 제15장의 경제학적 응용도 다루기를 권한다. 또 다른 과목 가칭 《게임이론Ⅱ》 혹은 《정보 및 게임이론》에서는 제1장, 제2장 2.1절~2.3절, 제3장, 제5장, 제11장~제19장을 학습한다. 후자를 학습하기 위해 전자를 선수할 필요는 없고 두 과목 따로 학습해도 무방하다. 본서를 한 학기 과목으로 강의할 경우 제1~3, 5~8, 10~15장은 필수적으로 다루되 나머지 내용은 독자의 선호와 필요에 따라 취사선택하면 된다.
저자가 1998년 졸저를 통해 게임이론을 국내에 소개한 이후 열 차례의 개정을 거쳐왔다. 개정판마다 선진 학문의 연구 결과와 추세를 반영함은 물론 국내 경제사회 현상의 설명에 적용하고자 미력이나마 최선을 다하였다. 나름의 의미 를 간직하고자 모든 판본들의 머리말을 QR코드에 링크해 둔다.
연세대학교 《게임이론과 응용》, 《정보 및 게임이론》, 《정치 및 공공경제》 수업에서 예리한 지적과 질문으로 강의록의 수준을 높여준 제자들, 꼼꼼하게 교정 작업을 수행해 준 조교 김성래, 김명규, 선윤승, 최도현, 그리고 박영사의 조성호 기획이사와 편집부 탁종민 과장에게 감사한다. 강호제위의 지속적인 지도편달과 조언을 부탁드린다.

아름다운 연세의 교정에서
2025년 8월
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